-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- MIT krb5 Security Advisory 2004-001 2004-06-01 Topic: buffer overflows in krb5_aname_to_localname Severity: serious SUMMARY ======= The krb5_aname_to_localname() library function contains multiple buffer overflows which could be exploited to gain unauthorized root access. Exploitation of these flaws requires an unusual combination of factors, including successful authentication to a vulnerable service and a non-default configuration on the target service. (See MITIGATING FACTORS below.) No exploits are known to exist yet. IMPACT ====== A remote attacker can potentially execute arbitrary code on hosts running vulnerable services. MITIGATING FACTORS ================== Only configurations which enable the explicit mapping or rules-based mapping functionality of krb5_aname_to_localname() are vulnerable. These configurations are not the default. If the explicit mapping functionality is enabled, an attacker must authenticate using a principal name listed in the explicit mapping list. If the rules-based mapping functionality is enabled, an attacker must be able to create arbitrary principal names either in the local Kerberos realm or in a remote realm from which the local realm's services are reachable by cross-realm authentication. AFFECTED SOFTWARE ================= All releases of MIT Kerberos 5, up to and including krb5-1.3.3. The upcoming krb5-1.3.4 release will contain a fix for this problem. Affected services contained in these releases include the remote login applications (e.g., ftp, rsh, rlogin, telnet), as well as ksu. Third-party application servers using the affected functionality of the krb5 library may be vulnerable. These services are only vulnerable in non-default configurations. FIXES ===== * If you are using the vulnerable functionality, consider disabling it immediately. Complete disabling of any configuration of explicit mapping or rules-based mapping should prevent exploitation. * The upcoming krb5-1.3.4 release will contain a fix for this problem. * Apply the following patch to src/lib/krb5/os/an_to_ln.c, and recompile the affected libraries and applications. Index: an_to_ln.c =================================================================== RCS file: /cvs/krbdev/krb5/src/lib/krb5/os/an_to_ln.c,v retrieving revision 5.39 diff -c -r5.39 an_to_ln.c *** an_to_ln.c 2002/09/03 19:29:34 5.39 - --- an_to_ln.c 2004/05/14 19:39:21 *************** *** 270,278 **** * If no regcomp() then just return the input string verbatim in the output * string. */ ! static void do_replacement(char *regexp, char *repl, int doall, char *in, char *out) { #if HAVE_REGCOMP regex_t match_exp; regmatch_t match_match; - --- 270,283 ---- * If no regcomp() then just return the input string verbatim in the output * string. */ ! #define use_bytes(x) \ ! out_used += (x); \ ! if (out_used > MAX_FORMAT_BUFFER) goto mem_err ! ! static int do_replacement(char *regexp, char *repl, int doall, char *in, char *out) { + size_t out_used = 0; #if HAVE_REGCOMP regex_t match_exp; regmatch_t match_match; *************** *** 287,303 **** do { if (!regexec(&match_exp, cp, 1, &match_match, 0)) { if (match_match.rm_so) { strncpy(op, cp, match_match.rm_so); op += match_match.rm_so; } strncpy(op, repl, MAX_FORMAT_BUFFER - 1 - (op - out)); op += strlen(op); cp += match_match.rm_eo; ! if (!doall) strncpy(op, cp, MAX_FORMAT_BUFFER - 1 - (op - out)); matched = 1; } else { strncpy(op, cp, MAX_FORMAT_BUFFER - 1 - (op - out)); matched = 0; } - --- 292,313 ---- do { if (!regexec(&match_exp, cp, 1, &match_match, 0)) { if (match_match.rm_so) { + use_bytes(match_match.rm_so); strncpy(op, cp, match_match.rm_so); op += match_match.rm_so; } + use_bytes(strlen(repl)); strncpy(op, repl, MAX_FORMAT_BUFFER - 1 - (op - out)); op += strlen(op); cp += match_match.rm_eo; ! if (!doall) { ! use_bytes(strlen(cp)); strncpy(op, cp, MAX_FORMAT_BUFFER - 1 - (op - out)); + } matched = 1; } else { + use_bytes(strlen(cp)); strncpy(op, cp, MAX_FORMAT_BUFFER - 1 - (op - out)); matched = 0; } *************** *** 322,338 **** - --- 332,352 ---- sdispl = (size_t) (loc1 - cp); edispl = (size_t) (loc2 - cp); if (sdispl) { + use_bytes(sdispl); strncpy(op, cp, sdispl); op += sdispl; } + use_bytes(strlen(repl)); strncpy(op, repl, MAX_FORMAT_BUFFER - 1 - (op - out)); op += strlen(repl); cp += edispl; if (!doall) + use_bytes(strlen(cp)); strncpy(op, cp, MAX_FORMAT_BUFFER - 1 - (op - out)); matched = 1; } else { + use_bytes(strlen(cp)); strncpy(op, cp, MAX_FORMAT_BUFFER - 1 - (op - out)); matched = 0; } *************** *** 340,346 **** - --- 354,368 ---- #else /* HAVE_REGEXP_H */ memcpy(out, in, MAX_FORMAT_BUFFER); #endif /* HAVE_REGCOMP */ + return 1; + mem_err: + #ifdef HAVE_REGCMP + regfree(&match_exp); + #endif + return 0; + } + #undef use_bytes /* * aname_replacer() - Perform the specified substitutions on the input *************** *** 412,418 **** /* Do the replacemenbt */ memset(out, '\0', MAX_FORMAT_BUFFER); ! do_replacement(rule, repl, doglobal, in, out); free(rule); free(repl); - --- 434,445 ---- /* Do the replacemenbt */ memset(out, '\0', MAX_FORMAT_BUFFER); ! if (!do_replacement(rule, repl, doglobal, in, out)) { ! free(rule); ! free(repl); ! kret = KRB5_LNAME_NOTRANS; ! break; ! } free(rule); free(repl); *************** *** 459,464 **** - --- 486,492 ---- char *fprincname; char *selstring = 0; int num_comps, compind; + size_t selstring_used; char *cout; krb5_data *datap; char *outstring; *************** *** 479,484 **** - --- 507,513 ---- */ current = strchr(current, ':'); selstring = (char *) malloc(MAX_FORMAT_BUFFER); + selstring_used = 0; if (current && selstring) { current++; cout = selstring; *************** *** 497,502 **** - --- 526,539 ---- aname, compind-1)) ) { + if ((datap->length < MAX_FORMAT_BUFFER) + && (selstring_used+datap->length + < MAX_FORMAT_BUFFER)) { + selstring_used += datap->length; + } else { + kret = ENOMEM; + goto errout; + } strncpy(cout, datap->data, (unsigned) datap->length); *************** *** 527,533 **** else kret = KRB5_CONFIG_BADFORMAT; ! if (kret) free(selstring); } } - --- 564,570 ---- else kret = KRB5_CONFIG_BADFORMAT; ! errout: if (kret) free(selstring); } } *************** *** 643,649 **** const char *hierarchy[5]; char **mapping_values; int i, nvalid; ! char *cp; char *typep, *argp; unsigned int lnsize; - --- 680,686 ---- const char *hierarchy[5]; char **mapping_values; int i, nvalid; ! char *cp, *s; char *typep, *argp; unsigned int lnsize; *************** *** 677,687 **** /* Just use the last one. */ /* Trim the value. */ ! cp = &mapping_values[nvalid-1] ! [strlen(mapping_values[nvalid-1])]; ! while (isspace((int) (*cp))) cp--; ! cp++; ! *cp = '\0'; /* Copy out the value if there's enough room */ if (strlen(mapping_values[nvalid-1])+1 <= (size_t) lnsize) - --- 714,727 ---- /* Just use the last one. */ /* Trim the value. */ ! s = mapping_values[nvalid-1]; ! cp = s + strlen(s); ! while (cp > s) { ! cp--; ! if (!isspace((int)(*cp))) ! break; ! *cp = '\0'; ! } /* Copy out the value if there's enough room */ if (strlen(mapping_values[nvalid-1])+1 <= (size_t) lnsize) The patch was generated against krb5-1.3.3; it may apply, with some offset, to other releases. This patch may also be found at: http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/advisories/2004-001-an_to_ln_patch.txt The associated detached PGP signature is at: http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/advisories/2004-001-an_to_ln_patch.txt.asc REFERENCES ========== This announcement and related security advisories may be found on the MIT Kerberos security advisory page at: http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/advisories/index.html The main MIT Kerberos web page is at: http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/index.html ACKNOWLEDGMENTS =============== Thanks to Christopher Nebergall for finding the single-byte overflow. Thanks to Nico Williams for finding a vulnerability in the rules-based mapping. Thanks to Matt Crawford for useful comments. DETAILS ======= krb5_aname_to_localname() translates a Kerberos principal name to a local account name, typically a UNIX username. In the file src/lib/krb5/os/an_to_ln.c, the helper functions aname_replacer(), do_replacement(), and rule_an_to_ln() do not perform adequate checks of the lengths of strings which contain the name of the principal whose authorization is being checked. This can result in the overflow of heap buffers when an attacker authenticates using a sufficiently long principal name. In addition, the implementation of the explicit mapping functionality in krb5_aname_to_localname() consistently writes a zero byte at a location one byte past the end of a heap buffer when handling a principal name matching an explicit mapping. Single-byte overflows of heap buffers are known to be exploitable on some architectures. The vulnerability in the explicit mapping functionality was fixed around December 2003 in the development sources, but the fix was not propagated to the krb5-1.3.x release branch. REVISION HISTORY ================ 2004-06-01 original release Copyright (C) 2004 Massachusetts Institute of Technology -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.0.7 (SunOS) iQCVAwUBQLzhKKbDgE/zdoE9AQEIQAP+Nr2GZig5o2TM/0hxmuSDKuDCHQ8k4KBr NCucgV8qVfhXw6MLX+PLX96CniyaFjuKGlS6PS7z2eTRt6qsvxohR1gAfZ7olN5u pDOl5/D9CXnNqwz5ulh7TiaWuVXZab5RfjveZSvxi2fR2CCdUnBab/J4jzOeQyl+ bjJPpeMJiQE= =yGUt -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----