OpenBSD Security Advisory - OpenSSH-2.3.1, a development snapshot, only checked if a public key for public key authentication was permitted. In the protocol 2 part of the server, the challenge-response step that ensures that the connecting client is in possession of the corresponding private key has been omitted. As a result, anyone who could obtain the public key listed in the users authorized_keys file could log in as that user without authentication. This vulnerability affects only OpenSSH version 2.3.1 with support for protocol 2 enabled. The latest official release OpenSSH 2.3.0 is not affected by this problem. The latest snapshot version OpenSSH 2.3.2 is not affected either. Fix available here.
68fbfb4c37fcf6a2ccb203e9d14a67d3faefbbe5b690c673b4d718c46e3d1004
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